Wednesday, 3 February 2016

138: Jurisdiction issue once again

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(hereinafter “Act”), deals with the dishonor of cheque. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002, inter alia, amended sections 138, 141 and 142 and inserted new sections 143 to 147 in the said Act to facilitate speedy disposal of cases relating to dishonor of a cheque through its summary trial as well as making them compoundable. The Act had not been very clear about the jurisdiction of the cases related to dishonor of a cheque. The present case sets out a bench mark with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts in such cases.

Brief Facts

1.      A cheque No. 1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, was issued by Inderpal Singh (hereinafter “Respondent”) to M/s. Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter “Appellant”) The cheque was in the sum of Rs. 26,958. The Appellant - presented the above cheque at the IDBI Bank in Indore. The Appellant received intimation of its being dishonored on 04.08.2006 at Indore.

2.      The Appellant issued a legal notice on 26.08.2006, which was served on the Respondent on 06.09.2006, demanding the amount depicted in the cheque. The Appellant informed the Respondent, that he would be compelled to initiate proceedings u/s 138 of the Act, if payment was not made by the Respondent within 15 days from the date of receipt of the legal notice.

3.      Consequent upon the issuance of the aforementioned legal notice wherein the Respondent was required to reimburse the cheque amount to the Appellant, and the Respondent having failed to discharge his obligation, proceedings were initiated by the Appellant on 13.10.2006 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, u/s 138 of the Act.

4.      The Respondent, preferred an application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, u/s 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter “Code”), contesting the territorial jurisdiction with respect to the above cheque drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. The prayer made by the Respondent, that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated by the Appellant was declined on 02.06.2009. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, relied on the judgment rendered by this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr[1], to record a finding in favour of the Appellant. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, dated 02.06.2009, the Respondent preferred a petition u/s 482 of the Code, in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench.

5.      Having examined the controversy in hand the High Court, by an order dated 03.12.2009, the petition filed by the Respondent was disposed of, by remitting the case to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, requiring him to pass a fresh order after taking into consideration the additional documents relied upon, and the judgments cited before the High Court.

6.      The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, yet again, by an order dated 11.01.2010 held, that he had the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the controversy raised by the Appellant u/s 138 the Act. The decision rendered by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, was again assailed by the Respondent in yet another petition filed by him u/s 482 of the Code in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. The High Court accepted the prayer made by the Respondent by holding, that the jurisdiction lay only before the Court wherein the original drawee bank was located, namely, at Chandigarh, where-from the Respondent had issued the concerned cheque.

Issue for Consideration

1.      Whether the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore had jurisdiction to adjudge a complaint u/s 138 of the Act?

Decision of the Court

1.      A perusal of the amended Section 142(2) by way of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment)Second Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance'),leaves no room for any doubt, especially in view of the explanation there under, that with reference to an offence u/s 138 of the Act, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account, would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.
2.      We are satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through Ordinance, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence u/s 138 of the Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also satisfied, based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case, would not stand in the way of the Appellant, insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises.


Critique:

The legislative reforms have always aimed at encouraging the usage of cheque and enhancing the credibility of the instrument so that the normal business transactions and settlement of liabilities could be ensured. The judgment accepted the explanation that  after the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, “the place where a cheque is delivered for collection, i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee or holder…where the drawee maintains an account, would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.” It also noted that on the issue of jurisdiction, Section 142A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would take precedence over the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This decision succeeded in breaking the judicial limbo caused so far, when the Supreme Court, held that the Ordinance will have a retrospective effect and any complaint under Section 138 of the Act will be filed in the place where the cheque is delivered for collection i.e., the branch of the bank of the payee, or holder in due course, or where the drawee maintains an account. It distinguished the judgment rendered in Dashrath’s case, to have no effect in view of the Ordinance.


In addition to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, the Negotiable Instrument (Amendment) Bill 2015 (“Amendment”) came to be passed by both the Houses of the Parliament on 07.12.2015, which further clarified that cheque bounce cases were to be filed in the courts which had jurisdiction over places where the cheque was presented for clearance or payment, and not the place of issue. And if a complaint against a person issuing a cheque had been filed in the court with the appropriate jurisdiction, then all subsequent complaints against that person would be filed in the same court, irrespective of the relevant jurisdiction area. The said amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act will have far-reaching implications for over 18 lakh cheque bounce cases across the country, of which about 38,000 are pending in High Courts.

STEPHEN KOEING VS ARBITRATOR NIXI AND ANR


The National Internet Exchange of India ( hereinafter “NIXI”), registered on 19/6/2003 u/s 25, Companies Act, 1956 as a Governmental non-profit organisation, falls under the Ministry of Communication & IT under the Department of Electronics & Information Technology. NIXI was established for peering of ISPs for routing the domestic traffic, better quality of service, reducing latency and bandwidth. Since 2005, NIXI manages the .IN Registry ensuring operational stability, security and reliability of the domain names ending ‘.in’. .IN domain name disputes are resolved by the .IN Dispute Resolution Policy (hereinafter “INDRP”) and INDRP Rules of Procedure. The other domain name disputes are resolved in accordance with the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (hereinafter “UDRP”). The present case deals with the dispute between a domain name and a trade mark. It also talks about the distinction between the two above mentioned policies and the different domains that they are applicable in.

Facts:
1.      Purohit applied under the Trademarks Act, 1999 ("the Act") on 17.03.2003 to register the trademark 'internet' relating to 'Tobacco, raw or manufactured, smokers’ articles, matches included in Class 34. The trademark certificate, issued on 13.07.2005 as per Section 23 (1) of the Trademarks Act, related to the application date. The Sunrise policy and secured domain name registration benefits using trademark were not availed. 

2.      NIXI issued "Sunrise Policy" for Indian registered trademark proprietors willing to protect their marks, .IN domain names, before the general public. The rationale was preference to Indian persons over foreign entities. Indian trademark proprietors' applications were to be submitted to the Registry through an accredited Registrar. Applications were accepted from 01.01.2005 to 21.01.2005.

3.      Koening, a U.S.A resident, had domain name 'internet.in' registered with the .IN Registry on 16.02.2005. On 31.01.2006, Purohit filed a complaint with the .IN Registry seeking cancellation of the registration of the domain name 'internet.in' of Koening. Purohit had used the trademark 'internet' beyond three years. The domain name 'internet.in' was confusingly similar to his trademark. Koening had- allegedly, registered in the .IN Registry, several domain names with no right or trademark like air.incomputer.in, etc. His intentions were selling the domain name to Purohit or another organization. Purohit alleged that Koening had parked the domain name and made money by luring customers to the website and tricking them into clicking on ads.

4.      Purohit filed a complaint with the .IN Registry seeking cancellation of the registration of the domain name 'internet.in' of Koening. Thereafter the arbitration on the lines of INDRP was initiated on the request of Koening.

5.      The Arbitrator, in the Award dated 05.07.2006, held:
(a) The domain name 'internet.in' of the Koeing was identical and confusingly similar to Purohit's trademark. Purohit (Complainant) did not establish his trademark over a generic word;
(b)  Koeing had no right over the domain name;
(c)  Koeing registered the domain name 'internet.in'  maliciously.
(d) Koeing was not entitled to retain the domain name. It was to be cancelled from Registry;
(e) Purohit was not entitled to transfer the domain name in his name. His bona fide rights were not established;
(f)  Koeing could not, allege reverse domain name hijacking by Purohit.
(g) The .IN Registry should confiscate 'internet.in'.

6.      Koening then moved to the Delhi High Court; the impugned order assented the arbitrator's finding. The fact was the goods for which Purohit held registration were not internet related services which Koening proposed to offer using the domain name. The impugned order stated that in e-commerce confusion can be caused.

7.      The learned Single Judge dissented the arbitrator’s conclusions in one issue:  Purohit did not establish legitimate interest over the term 'internet'. The learned Judge concluded that the arbitrator found the word generic without trademark rights. The reasoning was, as Purohit held a valid registration over the said mark, which went unchallenged by the Koening, the former's rights over the mark stood established. 

8.      The main contention of Koening was that the INDRP itself states that it is modelled in the line of the UDRP and to carve such a distinction between INDRP and UDRP as done in the impugned judgment is contrary to the intention and purpose of the INDRP.

Issues:
1.      Whether UDRP conditions are to be read into INDRP provisions?
2.      Whether the registration of a trademark, indicates an interest on the part of the Respondent (Purohit)?



Decision of the Court

1.      The Hon’ble Court found Koeing's submission that the UDRP conditions should be read into the INDRP provisions, unpersuasive. INDRP applies; its provisions were to be considered by the arbitrator in the present case undisputedly. UDRP is not umbrella legislation or constitutional instrument, to subordinate INDRP in norms’ hierarchy. Neither have force of law. Instead, since INDRP is the enforcement mechanism of norms governing NIXI, they constitute the norms applicable.  Nothing in the INDRP text supports the Koeing’s contention; there is no other compulsion.

2.      About a trademark registration, having no legitimate interest of Purohit; the court said that without conditions to execute trademark registrations’ search could not, according to Koeing, prejudice him. A trademark registration depends upon statutory conditions’ fulfilment, subject to the mark not falling within disqualifying conditions or disallowed in use and on the basis of its use, or proposal of the applicant to use it, subject to conditions. Therefore, Koeing’s contention that registration does not confer legitimate interest is unacceptable. In this context, the learned Judge used the case Satyam Infoway v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd.; Indian trademark law would apply for domain name use, wherever confusion or similarity issues arise between web services or domain names usage.

3.      The Court noticed that, the arbitrator and the Judge found that Purohit had discharged the onus upon him showing that Koeing had no legitimate interest in .IN. He failed to prove the existence of  ingredients such as " use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services", that he is "commonly known by the domain name even if he has no trademark" or that he is "making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name." These findings are fact based and not reviewable in appeal under Section 37.

4.      The Court noted, INDRP dispute resolution mechanism through arbitration falls within under an arbitration agreement u/s7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, awards made under the INDRP framework shall be tested under the law applicable for S. 34, the courts have limited powers to interfere with arbitral tribunal's determinations: if the findings are upon patent legal errors, or contrary to contract terms, or are unreasonable would interference happen.

Critique:


The judgment stands for future disputes regarding dispute resolution of NIXI regarding .in’ and other domain names. The judgment supports the distinction between INDRP and UNDRP provisions as the learned Judge created. The application reading INDRP provisions with UNDRP provisions was wrong. A party cannot use any non-applicable law to favour its case nor can it force the courts to do so. The case also very clearly affirms that the dispute resolution with respect to INDRP falls within the ambit of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore we can conclude that it can be an appealable order u/s 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and can be appealed against if it satisfies the conditions therein. 

Alpha Partners Facilitates Mera Grocer's Acquisition By Spencer's

Alpha Partners advised online grocery service Mera Grocer on its acquisition by the hypermarket chain Spencer’s Retail which was advised by Khaitan & Co. Read full story

RBI under RTI



The subject matter of the case is related to the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter ‘2005 Act’). It was established to provide a timely response to the citizen’s requests for government information. This empowers the citizens, promote transparency and accountability in the working of the Government, contain corruption, and make our democracy work for the people in real sense. This case deals with section 8 of 2005 Act which provides for exemption from disclosure of information.  

Brief Facts:

As per the facts of the case the statutory inspection of Makarpura Industrial Estate Cooperative Bank Ltd. was conducted by RBI (hereinafter ‘Petitioner’) under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Thereafter, the Respondent sought some information from the CPIO of Petitioner under the Act of 2005. CPIO replied to the queries of Respondent. Being unsatisfied with this the Respondent filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the First Appellate Authority. Being aggrieved by this, another appeal was filed by the Respondent where the CIC (Central Information Commissioner) asked the Petitioner to provide with the necessary information. Thereafter, the Petitioner moved to Delhi High Court challenging the CCI decision. After seeing the several other petitions similar to this case the Petitioner asked to transfer the case to Supreme Court which was allowed by the Delhi High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clubbed this case with several other similar cases and dispose of them together.         

Issue for Consideration:

1.      Whether all the information sought for under the Right to Information Act, 2005 can be denied by the Reserve Bank of India and other Banks to the public at large on the ground of economic interest, commercial confidence, and fiduciary relationship with other Bank on the one hand and the public interest on the other?
2.      If the answer to above question is in negative, then up to what extent the information can be provided under the 2005 Act?


Decision of Court:

The Hon’ble Court after going through the definition of ‘fiduciary relationship’ from several dictionaries and case laws held that the Petitioner does not place itself in a fiduciary relationship with the financial institutions because, the reports of the inspections, statements of the bank, information related to the business obtained by the Petitioner are not under the pretext of confidence or trust. In this case neither the Petitioner nor the Banks act in the interest of each other.

Petitioner is supposed to uphold public interest and not the interest of individual banks. Petitioner is clearly not in any fiduciary relationship with any bank. Petitioner has no legal duty to maximize the benefit of any public sector or private sector bank, and thus there is no relationship of ‘trust’ between them. Petitioner has a statutory duty to uphold the interest of the public at large, the depositors, the country’s economy and the banking sector. Thus, Petitioner ought to act with transparency and not hide information that might embarrass individual banks. It is duty bound to comply with the provisions of the RTI Act and disclose the information sought by the Respondents.

The Hon’ble Court further held that the baseless and unsubstantiated argument of the Petitioner that the disclosure would hurt the economic interest of the country is totally misconceived.

The Court further held that the exemption contained in Section 8(1)(e) applies to exceptional cases and only with regard to certain pieces of information, for which disclosure is unwarranted or undesirable. If information is available with a regulatory agency not in fiduciary relationship, there is no reason to withhold the disclosure of the same.  The RTI Act under Section 2(f) clearly provides that the inspection reports, documents etc. fall under the purview of “Information” which is obtained by the public authority (Petitioner) from a private body. Even if we were to consider that Petitioner and the Financial Institutions shared a “Fiduciary Relationship”, Section 2(f) would still make the information shared between them to be accessible by the public. However, in the instant case the Petitioner is accountable and as such it has to provide information to the information seekers under Section 10(1) of the RTI Act.


Lastly the Court said that, not all the information that the Government generates will or shall be given out to the public. And when it comes to national economic interest, disclosure of information about currency or exchange rates, interest rates, taxes, the regulation or supervision of banking, insurance and other financial institutions, proposals for expenditure or borrowing and foreign investment could in some cases harm the national economy, particularly if released prematurely. However, lower level economic and financial information, like contracts and departmental budgets should not be withheld under this exemption.   

Meru V Uber: Taxis collide at the CCI

The subject matter of the case is related to the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter ‘The Act’). It was established to prevent activities that have an adverse effect on competition in India. This case is filed under Section 19 of The Act which is in contravention of Section 3 and 4 of the Act and deals with the dominant position of an enterprise.    

Brief Facts:

As per the facts of the case the Informant is a company engaged in radio taxi business in India through its fully owned subsidiaries Meru Cab Company Pvt. Ltd., (MCCPL) and V-Link Automotive Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter “V-Link”). The Informant claims to have started offering radio taxi service in Kolkata through its subsidiary V-Link in September 2014 with brand name “Meru Flexi”.

Respondent No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Respondent is engaged in the provision of radio taxi services under the brand name “Uber”. Respondents entered into the Indian market sometime in the year 2013 and it started its operations in Kolkata in August 2014. The radio taxi services in Kolkata are being offered by Respondent Group through two different categories/ brands, “Uber X” (sedan cars) and “Uber Go” (low range hatch back cars). Respondent no. 1 and 2 are in contract with each other where Respondent No. 1 promotes its business.  

Contention of Informant:

The Informant contended that the Respondent no. 1 is merely a face of Respondent no. 2 & 3 in India. They alleged that the Respondent armed with global funding, has adopted anti-competitive business model and unleashed a series of abusive practice that are prohibited within The Act to strengthen its position of dominance in different markets and to eliminate otherwise equally efficient competitors from the market. As per them the average market price of taxis before the introduction of Respondent was 20-22 per km. Respondent introduced themselves at the price of 15 per km. Thereafter informant came in Kolkata with market prize of 20 per km but was forced to reduce themselves at 15 per km and offering incentive to their drivers so as to match with the Respondent group. It is further alleged by the Informant that seeing the growth of them Respondent further reduced the price to unreasonable low rate of 9 per km due to which their market started coming down. The Informant has asserted that Respondent Group holds a dominant position in the relevant product market in Kolkata by virtue of their market share and other factors laid down under section 19(4) of The Act.    

Contention of Respondent:

The Respondent group denied the contentions made by the Informant and alleged that in November 2014, OLA launched operations in Kolkata under the brand of “OLA Sedan”. Subsequently, OLA launched its low cost “OLA Mini” services in Kolkata in March 2015. Informant has submitted that its business began to suffer only after February 2015, i.e. March 2015. Therefore, the Informant’s fall in business cannot be attributed to it and in fact seems to be attributable more to the entry of OLA Mini. Further Respondent claimed that its business model is based on efficiencies, with a view to lower costs and pass such benefits to the consumers. Kolkata has already witnessed a drastic increase in the availability of radio taxis and a significant reduction in price. This is precisely consumer welfare that competition law seeks to promote.    

Issue for Consideration:

Whether the Respondent can said to have a dominant position in Kolkata under Section 4 of the Competition Act?

Decision :

The Commission held that, as far as the relevant product market is concerned, the decisive factor for ascertaining the contours of relevant product market is substitutability of the product/service as perceived by the consumer. The basic characteristics, intended end-use, price etc. of different alternatives are some of the factors that help in determining whether the two products are substitutable or not. In this regard, however, it is notable that commuters in Kolkata rely on the yellow taxis for their day to day travelling/transportation requirements owing to their ease in booking, predictability in terms of availability, low pricing etc. Therefore, the Kolkata is a peculiar market in itself. The active presence of yellow taxis and the continuous reliance of commuters on such taxis indicate that yellow taxis provides a viable alternative, in effect posing a significant competitive constraint on the radio taxi operators. Therefore, the relevant product market in the present case would be the market for ‘services offered by radio taxis and yellow taxis’.

Lastly, with regard to the relevant geographic market the Commission also held that, owing to region specific demand by the end consumer and difference in regulatory architecture, each city/ State would constitute a different market in itself. The operations of taxis are restricted to the city/ State limits and they generally do not have the permit to go beyond the boundaries of a city/ State. Moreover, customers desirous of taking a taxi for travel in a city/ State would have to rely upon existing taxi operators in the city/ State. The alternative to opt such services from a company beyond the geographical limit of the city/state would not be feasible for the consumers but also for the company considering the distance, cost factor, etc. Moreover, since transport is a state subject under the Indian constitution, the taxi services market is largely regulated by State transport authorities making the conditions of competition homogenous only within a particular city/ State. Keeping into consideration the foregoing, and having regard to the distinctive conditions of competition in Kolkata, the relevant geographic market in the present case would be “Kolkata”.


Hence, it appears that there exists stiff competition between Uber and OLA with regard to the services they offer in the radio taxi industry in Kolkata. Therefore, even if the relevant market definition proposed by the Informant is accepted, the Respondent Group does not seem to hold a dominant position owing to an even larger share held by one of its competitors. 

Legal Updates: Recent changes in the provisions relating to Incorporation of Companies

Ministry of Corporate Affairs has, vide notification dated January 22, 2016, notified Companies (Incorporation) Amendment Rules, 2016 (Rules) having effect from January 26, 2016, with an objective of speedy disposal of incorporation applications within stipulated time frames.

Further, apart from the numerous changes notified by the aforesaid Rules, the most significant change brought in by another notification dated January 22, 2016, that provides greater “Ease of Doing Business” to corporate, is the establishment of Central Registration Centres (CRC) having territorial jurisdiction all over India for speedy disposal of applications for reservation of names. Establishment of CRC will significantly reduce the time taken to incorporate a Company in India, for a separate body will now be empowered to deal with the applications for reservation of names. The CRC shall function under the administrative control of Registrar of Companies, Delhi (ROC Delhi), who shall act as the Registrar of the CRC until a separate Registrar is appointed to the CRC. The CRC shall process applications for reservation of name i.e. Form No. INC-1. However, the processing and approval of name proposed in e-Form No. INC-29 shall continue to be done by the respective Registrar of Companies having jurisdiction over incorporation of companies.

The amendments brought about by the said notification are enumerated in the table below:


S. No.
Amendment
Position before the amendment
Effect of the amendment

1.

Rule 8(2)(b)(ii) shall be omitted

Name of the company need not necessarily be indicative of its principle business activities, but if name has any indication of objects that indication should be in conformity with the objects of the Company

Now the name will be considered desirable even if the words used are not in conformity with the objects mentioned in the memorandum.

2.

Rule 8(2)(b)(x) shall be omitted

Names that are vague or abbreviated based on the names of promoters, were not allowed

However abbreviation of names of existing Companies for formation of a new Company as subsidiary or JV or as an associate company after following the requirements of the Act, was allowed. 

The recent omission in the amendment notification has removed all restrictions on abbreviated names and unlocks a good numbers of creative names for companies

3.

Rule 8(2)(b)(xvii) shall be omitted

Earlier, proposed Companies were not allowed to have names that intended or likely to produce a misleading impression regarding the scope or scale of its activities

Now there is no such restriction and Companies have been given the freedom to have any name without any presumption of misleading impression

4.

Rule 8 (3) shall be omitted

The old rules provided that any change in activities must be reflected in the name of the Company, within 6 months from the change in activity of the Company

By virtue of the recent amendment, there is no need now to change the name of the Company to reflect its new line of activities.

5.

Rule 8 (4) shall be omitted

There was a requirement of furnishing the proof of relation in case the proposed name included the names of relatives of promoters, no objection certificate in case the proposed name included names of persons other than the promoters or their close blood relatives, along with the application for name reservation.


The requirements of furnishing documents like proof of relation or no objection certificate along with the application for reservation of name, have been done away with.

6.

Rule 9 shall be substituted with the following:

“An application for the reservation of a name shall be made in Form No. INC – 1 along with the fee as provided in the Companies (Registration offices and fees) Rules, 2014 which may be approved or rejected, as the case may be, by the Registrar, Central Registration Centre.”

Under the erstwhile rules, an application for the reservation of a name shall be made in Form No. INC – 1 along with the fee as provided in the Companies (Registration offices and fees) Rules, 2014

Now the applications for reservation of name will be dealt with by the Registrar, Central Registration Centre.

New rule is in alignment with Notification to establish Central Registration Centre, as discussed above.

7.

Insertion of (ba) after Rule 36(12)(b):

(ba) After the resubmission of the documents and on completion of second opportunity, if the registrar still finds that the documents are defective or incomplete, he shall give third opportunity to remove such defects or deficiencies;'

Provided that the total period for re-submission of documents shal1 not exceed a total period of thirty days.


Two opportunities for removing the defects or deficiencies from the incorporation application in Form INC-29, were given to the stakeholders, under the erstwhile Rules.

The number of opportunities for rectification of defects, have been increased to three whereas the time remains the same i.e. thirty days from the date of submission of form.

8

For the words “two opportunities”, the words “three opportunities” shall be substituted.


Previously, two opportunities were given to the stakeholders to rectify the defects in the incorporation application in Form INC-29.

Now, the number of opportunities to rectify the defects in the application, have been extended to three.